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FAKLMISC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 MISS UNIVERSE, L.P., LLLP, et al., 4 Plaintiffs, 5 v. 15 CV 5377 (JGK) 6 UNIVISION NETWORKS & STUDIOS, 7 INC., et al., 8 Defendants. 9 New York, N.Y. 10 October 20, 2015 4:07 p.m. 11 Before: 12 HON. JOHN G. KOELTL, 13 District Judge 14 APPEARANCES 15 LAROCCA HORNIK ROSEN GREENBERG & BLAHA LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs 16 BY: LAWRENCE S. ROSEN 17 -and-BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN, LLP BY: JEFFREY L. GOLDMAN 18 19 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP Attorneys for Defendants 20 BY: MIGUEL A. ESTRADA AMER AHMED 21 22 23 24 25

(Case called)

MR. ESTRADA: My partner, Randy Mastro, asked me to apologize for not being here. He is on trial in judge front of Judge Rakoff as we speak.

THE COURT: No need to apologize. I accept that.

I know people from Gibson Dunn. I've met Mr. Estrada. Nothing about that affects anything that I do in the case.

So, Mr. Goldman, Mr. Rosen, tell me about the case, please.

MR. ROSEN: Yes, your Honor. This is a premotion conference. It's not clear to us the reasons why the defendant will be seeking to dismiss the claims in the complaint.

Ostensibly, your Honor, our client, Miss Universe, was in contract with Univision, the Spanish broadcaster, for the Miss USA, Miss Universe, and other pageants. Mr. Donald Trump, a member of the limited partnership that comprised

Miss Universe, when he declared his candidacy for President, made some remarks in the opinion of the defendants that they found to be somewhat offensive and as a result, in our view, made a business decision to terminate the contract. In other words, they chose not to affiliate with the Miss Universe pageant and directly with Mr. Trump.

Your Honor, we certainly understand at a business level why that decision might have been made by the powers that be at Univision. However, actions have consequences. They

chose knowingly to breach the contract. And it is our belief that as a result of the termination of the agreement and their decision not to air a Spanish language pageant, they violated the terms of the contract and they're indebted to us for the five-year term of the agreement at roughly 13 and a half million dollars.

There are additional claims that are asserted in the complaint, your Honor, multiple claims, all of which we believe state a valid cause of action under New York law. Apparently, Univision disagrees, and that's why we're here today.

THE COURT: What are the other claims?

MR. ROSEN: Yes, your Honor. Claims include breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with contract, defamation claim, and a claim for punitive damages and a claim for attorneys' fees.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, defamation, what after defamation?

MR. ROSEN: I'm sorry, your Honor?

THE COURT: You said a claim for defamation and then before attorneys' fees.

MR. ROSEN: Punitive damages. Your Honor, we recognize and we do intend to clarify that the punitive damages claim as it's asserted and the attorneys' fees are damages elements of the breach of contract claim.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROSEN: If your Honor may, on the defamation claim, in the aftermath of the decision by Univision to not proceed with the contract with Miss Universe, a senior level executive at Univision thought that it would be prudent, for reasons that we truly don't understand, to juxtapose a photograph of Mr. Trump next to Dylann Roof. Dylann Roof, of course, is the person who went into a church in Charleston, South Carolina, and executed in cold blood nine members of that church. That is a statement under New York law. The statement by Univision is that Mr. Trump is a murderer or that he incites others to commit murder.

We recognize, of course, your Honor, that that statement might be susceptible to multiple interpretations depending on who the reviewer is. That question ultimately, we believe, is an issue of fact for a finder of fact.

THE COURT: Mr. Trump is not an individual plaintiff, is he, in the case?

MR. ROSEN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh, he is. Yes, okay. So that's a claim only by Mr. Trump?

MR. ROSEN: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. Let me listen to the defense as to what the basis for the motion to dismiss is.

MR. ESTRADA: Thank you, your Honor.

As Mr. Rosen stated, we are here on a premotion

conference. We previously had agreed with Mr. Trump's counsel that we would agree on a schedule for the motion that has been so ordered by the Part I judge, but the grounds as I will state them are as follows.

There is defamation claim which rests on a reposting on Instagram by a Univision executive of a side-by-side photo of a similarly coiffed Trump and Dylann Roof. Mr. Trump, as everybody knows, is running for President of the United States. The complaint nowhere asserts what the actual defamatory statement was. And under New York law, there would be no reasonable view under which anybody would take this as a statement of fact that Mr. Trump is a murderer. That itself actually is not stated in the complaint.

At the very most, this is a parody of Mr. Trump's very often parodied hairdo and of his political opinions, which as somebody who is running for the President of the United States is not at all unusual.

All of the statements that are or could be alleged to be giving rise to defamation in this case are absolutely protected by the New York and federal Constitution. That is at the high level of the motion to dismiss on the defamation claim.

Of course, Mr. Trump also claims damages for defamation per se. There is no basis in the complaint for a claim of defamation per se. He fails to plead any damages.

His claim that this cost him \$500 million in damages is on its face exorbitant, inexplicable, and certainly unexplained.

There is a claim for tortious interference with a contract or contracts which, again, are not identified in the complaint.

As you may know and as is obvious from the complaint itself, in the aftermath of Mr. Trump's announcement for President on June 16, there were a number of companies, including Univision and NBC, that severed commercial relationships with Mr. Trump and his businesses. Those included Macy's, the City of New York, NASCAR, ESPN. It's a fairly high number.

Notwithstanding all of that, the allegation of the complaint is that there was some unspecified lobbying on the part of Univision to convince NBC to drop its commercial understandings with Mr. Trump. Just on the basic Iqbal/Twombly level, there is an obvious possible explanation for the fact NBC decided to cut its relationships with Mr. Trump, as did many entities. But, in any event, there are no allegations in the complaint as to what exactly it is that anybody at Univision did, other than to say that upon information and belief, there was some lobbying of NBC to drop Mr. Trump.

Again, I have a perfect right to urge as a citizen anybody and everybody in the world to stop doing business with Mr. Trump. That is again protected by the First Amendment.

There is no allegation of any improper means used or coercion or anything that New York law would recognize as a basis for a tortious interference claim.

There is, as was mentioned, two contract claims. In fact, one of them is completely redundant of the other. It's a pleading of the covenant of good faith in a completely redundant basis. But the basis in gross for the dismissal of that claim is on the basis and on the face of the complaint, Mr. Trump and Miss Universe — if he in fact is authorized to speak for Miss Universe, which is something I'm getting to presently — they disclose that the whole basis for the bargain with Univision was to get the pageant to the Spanish speaking, largely Mexican American audience of Univision.

When Donald Trump decided to start his presidential bid by engaging in what was widely and reasonably perceived as a racist rant against Mexican Americans, he himself destroyed the value of the contract to Univision, frustrated its purpose, and prevented the Univision network from being able to have a first-class broadcast as was guaranteed in the contract.

There is a final claim for fees which, of course, would fall with any claim under the contract. I should clarify --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. There are two contract claims.

One is breach of contract. The defendant didn't abide by the terms of the contract. The second is breach of the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing. And the argument is what?

MR. ESTRADA: The argument on that is that under the law, if the basis for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is identical, as it is in this case, for the breach of the written contract, then that is merely an additional argument for the claimed breach of contract but not in itself a claim.

THE COURT: Okay. And the defense to the breach of contract is?

MR. ESTRADA: Is frustration of purpose that appears on the face of the complaint.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MR. ESTRADA: Frustration of purpose that appears on the face of the complaint.

THE COURT: Can I really decide a motion to dismiss that the straight breach of contract claim should be dismissed on the basis of alleged frustration of purpose?

MR. ESTRADA: I would say yes, although it is relatively rare, I recognize, your Honor. I will point out that it is a very unusual case in which the plaintiff is somebody who's subject to many judicially noticeable facts and who himself has come into court pleading the contract terms and the basis on which the contract was entered, which simply as a matter of common sense established the defense of frustration of purpose because the whole point of the contract, as admitted

in the complaint, is to reach the largely Mexican American audience that Univision has and the largely Hispanic audience and to have a broadcast that will be tailored to the Spanish speaking audience, none of whom would want to have anything to do with Mr. Trump.

THE COURT: And I can decide frustration of purpose as a matter of law based just on the pleading in the complaint?

MR. ESTRADA: And on judicially noticeable facts.

That would be our submission here. Obviously, we're not here to argue the motion on its merits. But I believe that with respect to the very allegations of the complaint and the nature of Mr. Trump's current bid, the nature of the damage and of the commercial relationship is fairly evident and this is a case in which those matters are appropriate for a motion.

Believe me, I don't usually go into court and move to dismiss on the basis of a defense, but it is also rare that somebody comes into court and essentially pleads it for me.

THE COURT: You say relatively rare. Are there any similar cases where a breach of contract claim has been dismissed on such a basis?

MR. ESTRADA: I don't know that I can readily come up with one at the moment. But we will have a briefing for you in the motion, if you allow it, your Honor.

THE COURT: I can't prevent it, actually. Okay.

MR. ESTRADA: But there is a final overarching issue

that also deals with this question. The contract claim, if there is one, is one that belongs to Miss Universe. As the complaint itself alleges, at the time of the filing of the complaint, Mr. Trump was a minority partner in the joint venture with NBC being the majority partner. There is a very inadequate and completely conclusory allegation that demand on Miss Universe would have been futile. So as to all the claims but defamation, there's a question of authority.

I will say if you leave the face of the complaint, it has been widely publicized that since the filing of the complaint, Mr. Trump and NBC have resolved their differences — this has been in the press — and that as a result of the resolution of those differences and the settlement, Mr. Trump acquired the pageant and then sold it to somebody else.

And since we're here and since lack of authority would actually extend to all claims but defamation, maybe this would be a good opportunity for Mr. Rosen to advise the Court what the basis of authority is on all counts but defamation.

THE COURT: Okay. All counts but the defamation?

MR. ESTRADA: Yes, because if there's no authority to sue on behalf of Miss Universe, even putting aside whether we have independent grounds on each claim, as we believe we do, the question of authority would dispose of all claims but defamation. And the Constitution, common sense, and basic law would deal with the defamation question itself.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Rosen.

MR. ROSEN: Yes, your Honor. To that point we do acknowledge that the complaint needs to be cleaned up to reflect the consolidation ostensibly of the parties. There's no longer a need for a derivative claim. There has been a financial transaction that has taken place and, clearly, Miss Universe L.P., the named plaintiff, has full authority to bring this action. And we will in very short order, your Honor, be amending the complaint to reflect that.

THE COURT: Shouldn't you at least ask for permission?

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, yes. I perhaps mistakenly
believed that we were within our as of right period.

THE COURT: You may well be. You may well be. But I was going to give you the opportunity to amend in any event because it makes no sense to have a motion to dismiss which would be greeted by an application to deny the motion to dismiss, or if I was inclined to grant the motion to dismiss, to allow the plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint.

So you've heard the grounds that the defendant wants to raise in response to the current complaint. Yes, I mean by all means, you can file an amended complaint. And if the defendants then file a motion to dismiss on the grounds that they said that they intend to move to dismiss, I take it you

will not then ask for leave to file yet another amended complaint so that I write one opinion on the first motion to dismiss, you then file an amended complaint, and I have another motion to dismiss, right? You'll give me your best amended complaint, right?

MR. ROSEN: Yes, your Honor. Absent any newly discovered information, that's absolutely correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me go over some of the issues that were raised on the purported motion to dismiss and from what you've already said.

In your amended complaint you will explain what the authority is to bring the complaint, right?

MR. ROSEN: Yes.

THE COURT: And you're going to drop any independent claim for punitive damages or attorneys' fees. That's just part of your ad damnum, right?

MR. ROSEN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, you've heard a detailed explanation as to why you have no defamation claim. And I take it to the extent that you think you have a defamation claim, you will plead as much as possible as to why you have a defamation claim. Yes?

MR. GOLDMAN: We will, your Honor. And I just want to say to that point, if one of the bases for the lack of a defamation claim is the argument that the posting to a mass

murderer was solely because of hair style and having nothing to do with mass murder, I don't think we need to address that.

But with respect to defamation per se, we will certainly be addressing that.

THE COURT: All right.

With respect to tortious interference with contract, you're talking about the defendants having tortiously interfered with other contracts other than the contract which is being claimed as breach of contract, right?

MR. ROSEN: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And the defendants say that claim doesn't even survive under Iqbal and Twombly because there are no specific allegations as to what the defendants did to interfere with other specific contracts and that they used improper means or otherwise improperly interfered with the other contracts.

And you say?

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, Mr. Randy Falco, the president of Univision at the time, previously worked for NBC. And the timing of NBC's decision to not go forward with the pageant is somewhat suspect given that just a day or two earlier they had made --

THE COURT: But the tortious interference with contract is not under the Univision contract.

MR. ROSEN: No, it's on the NBC arrangement with Trump. And, your Honor, there the issue is that Mr. Trump, the

individual, his views on immigration were well-known before this contract was entered into with Univision. It should not have come as any surprise. It became an issue for Univision, of course, when he announced he's running for President.

NBC's original response to this was, look, Mr. Trump has his personal views and we don't agree with them, those are his views, and it is what it is. And then, lo and behold, we believe, Mr. Falco used some of his connections and some of his relationships that had developed, not to mention the fact that he had access to a demographic that was very important to NBC, and we believe there was some coercion and we believe that there was some suggestions that NBC not do business with Trump.

I believe that we have enough, your Honor, to show malice, which is an element of a tortious interference with contract claim, and also economic duress would satisfy at least for pleading purposes.

THE COURT: The argument on the other side is that there are no factual allegations to show that Univision actually used its influence it had with NBC to get NBC to act in any way. Now, you say, well, if it did, then it was malicious and you can satisfy the other elements for the tort. But the argument on the other side is there are insufficient factual allegations to support a plausible conclusion that in fact Univision was doing that.

And so there certainly is at least a question why you

want to delay the case on breach of contract by adding other claims which invite a motion to dismiss. Maybe the motion to dismiss would come in any event, but I just raise it with you. All I have is what the parties have told me in connection with this conference, although I haven't heard the factual basis for the belief that Univision was doing something vis-a-vis NBC, which certainly has a substantial presence, that it doesn't need Univision to tell it what to do, so.

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, we are at a bit of a disadvantage in that we were not privy to any of the conversations that we believe took place between Mr. Falco and senior executives at Univision. Now, hypothetically, if there were emails out there or phone calls that were made or discussions, that would be evidence supporting our claim. We just find it very suspect, the timing. NBC took a position and then quickly reversed that position.

THE COURT: Well, you're going to file an amended complaint. One would suspect that the standard for pleading a plausible claim is we find it suspicious. So I don't decide anything until it's briefed on the facts and the law. You're going to file an amended complaint. There will surely be a motion to dismiss. The more claims, the longer the motion to dismiss, the longer it takes to decide.

There is then the issue of whether there's an independent breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing as an independent claim, which is something you should look at because there are lots of cases which dismiss such a claim at the outset as duplicative of the claim of breach of contract. There certainly is a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but there are many cases which say if there's a breach of contract claim, the breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is duplicative because you have to interpret the contract with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Okay.

MR. ESTRADA: Your Honor, may I, solely in aid of the Court's purpose of just going through this exercise once and in partial response to statements by counsel on the defamation, I just want to make clear that it is not our position solely that a reasonable person would view this as a parody of Mr. Trump's hair. It is that there is no identifiable statement of fact, that it is at most an opinion on his hair, his views, or a parody of the man, it doesn't really matter, and the First Amendment and the New York constitution make it fully protected.

THE COURT: Was there any printing that went along with the juxtaposition of the two photos?

MR. ESTRADA: There is a text on top of them that says "no comment."

And solely on the point of Iqbal, again, I will point out that I don't need to gild the lily on the plausibility.

And the whole point of Twombly and Iqbal was to preclude the fishing expedition of "we don't know but we suspect" and to cut it off at the motion to dismiss.

There is another issue that is part of that claim that should be brought up now and it is that they have settled with NBC according to public reports. If they don't know now, I don't know what else they're going to find out.

THE COURT: I doubt that I could take that into account on a motion to dismiss. I mean whether they settled with NBC, what the terms of that settlement were, all of that would seem to go far beyond the complaint.

MR. ESTRADA: Well, we'll see what the complaint if refiled says. I was mentioning it in aid of a further point which is that on question of law, if that is either in the complaint or judicially noticeable, that would bear on whether the complaint apart from the factual failings establishes a claim as a matter of law because they settled the claim that allegedly gives source to the damage.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLDMAN: Your Honor, if I may, we will certainly with the Court's guidance amend the complaint with the idea being we're not trying to engage in unnecessary motion practice. I would hope that defendants' counsel listening to your Honor with respect to frustration of purpose because in New York, if what is said is foreseeable, it's a complete

defense to that. And Mr. Trump many times well before the contract was signed with Univision had an opinion that was somewhat similar if not identical to his opinion that he enunciated when he announced for his presidency. There was no morals clause. They were free not to enter into that agreement.

"judicially noticeable facts" with respect to Mr. Trump, it's those judicially noticeable facts that make the frustration of purpose inapplicable because it was completely reasonable for Univision to have suspected that and hopefully that won't be one aspect of the motion.

THE COURT: Okay. When do you want to file your amended complaint?

MR. ROSEN: Within two weeks, your Honor, if that would be acceptable.

THE COURT: That's fine. Sure.

So amended complaint November 6.

Time to answer or move with respect to the amended complaint is?

MR. ESTRADA: We would ask for 20 days, your Honor.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. ESTRADA: We previously had a stip, and with respect to their response to our motion, we're happy to stand by the stipulation and give them 45 days as previously agreed.

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THE COURT: Whoa.
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               MR. ESTRADA: If they need it.
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               THE COURT: So 45 days to respond. No, they don't
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      need that.
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               So the amended complaint November 6.
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               The answer or move by November 30 --
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               MR. ESTRADA: Excuse me, your Honor.
               THE COURT: -- which is a Monday. It's the Monday
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      after Thanksgiving. The 26th is Thanksgiving.
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               And response to any motion to dismiss?
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               MR. ESTRADA: Your Honor, if I could have a plea to
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      reconsider at the urging plea of somebody who needs to be
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      involved and won't be available for Thanksqiving, if we could
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      have an extra week to take the holiday into account.
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               THE COURT: Not a problem.
               So answer or move by December 4.
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               Response to any motion to dismiss?
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               MR. GOLDMAN: Your Honor, we had stipulated and I
      believe your Honor so ordered I think it was 45 days.
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               MR. ESTRADA: Forty-five days.
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               MR. GOLDMAN: We don't need 45 days. We can do it in
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      30 days, your Honor.
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               MR. ESTRADA: But we stand by our bargains on that,
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      your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Sure.
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Response to any motion to dismiss, January 8, 2016. And then the reply? MR. ESTRADA: If we could ask for two weeks, that should be enough, your Honor. THE COURT: January 22. Okay. I'll enter an order which puts in that schedule. Anything else? MR. ESTRADA: Nothing for the defense, your Honor. MR. ROSEN: Nothing for the plaintiff, your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Good to see you all.